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Abstract—The shift towards a completely virtualized network-
ing environment is triggered by the emergence of software defined
networking and network function virtualization (NFV). Network
service providers have unlocked immense capabilities by these
technologies, which have enabled them to dynamically adapt
to user needs by deploying their network services in real-time
through generating Service Function Chain (SFCs). However,
NFV still faces challenges that hinder its full potentials, including
availability guarantees, network security, and other performance
requirements. For this reason, the deployment of NFV applica-
tions remains critical as it should meet different service level
agreements while insuring the security of the virtualized func-
tions. In this paper, we tackle the challenge of securing these SFCs
by introducing virtual security functions (VSFs) into the latency-
aware deployment of NFV applications. This work insures the
optimal placement of the SFC components including the security
functions while considering the performance constraints and the
VSFs’ operational rules such as, functions’ alliance, proximity,
and anti-affinity. This paper develops a mixed integer linear
programming model to optimally place all the requested SFCs
while satisfying the above constraints and minimizing the latency
of every SFC and the intercommunication delay between the
SFC components. The simulations are evaluated against a greedy
algorithm on the virtualized Evolved Packet Core use case and
have shown promising results in maintaining the security rules
while achieving minimum delays.
Index Terms—Network function virtualization, Software de-
fined networking, Security, Security Practices, Cloud, Service
function chain, Next generation network.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the exponential increase in networking demands, Net-
work Service Providers (NSPs) are facing challenges such
as, meeting strict delay requirements for mission critical
applications, ensuring high-availability of network services,
and securing vast amounts of data traversing the network. With
their current legacy networking infrastructures, dealing with
such challenges has proven to be very costly as it heavily
increases the capital expenditures (CAPEX) and operating
expenditures (OPEX) of the network provider [1]. To mitigate
these costs and tackle those challenges, NSPs are shifting
to new models; Software Defined Networking (SDN) and
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [2]. The objective is to
use SDN and NFV as platforms for rapid expansion of their
services, adding innovation, and lowering their costs while
maintaining their Quality of Service (QoS) and tackling the
aforementioned challenges. SDN and NFV have shown great
potential in improving the economics of networking in parallel
to giving the abilities to deploy, migrate, or terminate network
services on-demand and optimizing the network performance
by dynamically assigning resources when needed [3].
In an NFV Infrastructure (NFVI), NSPs can quickly adapt
to the end-user requirements by instantiating Virtual Network
Functions (VNFs) in data centers (DCs) or network edges
in a way to optimize their network resources and satisfy the
carrier grade requirements from low latency constraints up to
the high availability of network services [4]. These VNFs are
chained together to form an NFV application/service where
data traverses specific VNFs following a specific order to
create a Service Function Chain (SFC). Fig. 1 shows a set
of sample SFCs that can be generated for a certain NFV
application that can run on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
servers. We can clearly see this architecture implemented
today in content delivery networks, Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
communications, home environment virtualization, and many
more [5]. However, with all those benefits, there are many
challenges that should be addressed such as, security, comput-
ing performance, and carrier-grade service assurance [5].
This work aims at enhancing the security of NFV services to
mitigate challenges that arise due to the incorrect or inefficient
placement of those VNFs. The process of placing VNFs in
a network environment can be very complex. With a large
set of candidate nodes that can host VNFs, the choice must
be optimized to comply with the network requirements and
constraints such as, network delay, availability of resources,
security-aware placement needs, cost, available bandwidth,
and other QoS requirements. There has been significant re-
search towards optimizing the placement of the VNFs [6][7].
However, there is still the need for extensive research regarding
how these SFCs can be secured while still maintaining the
previously mentioned constraints. In an NFVI, many security
functions are virtualized and placed to ensure the security of
the network. These functions include Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI), Virtual Private Network (VPN) server, Firewall, In-
trusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System
(IPS), and many other services. In most cases, these functions
are treated like any other VNF instance and are placed while
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overlooking their operation mechanism requirements. This
practice creates critical vulnerabilities as these services require
specific conditions to operate optimally or even correctly. Such
conditions include their placement location with respect to
the source or the destination, the type of traffic that can be
passed through them, and the link delays to their dependent
components. These conditions must be satisfied to ensure that
the network is using the best security approaches to provide
protection against attacks on its services.
In this work, we aim to tackle the challenges of virtualized
security functions’ (VSFs) placement within an NFVI with the
goal of ensuring their optimal operations by considering their
functionality and non-functionality-based constraints. This pa-
per proposes a solution to achieve this objective while ensuring
that all the requested network services are placed in a manner
that guarantees the minimal latency achievable for that SFC.
We propose a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) op-
timization model to minimize the SFC delay by encapsulating
the security, performance, and other QoS constraints of the
SFC. The optimization model captures the security constraints
of the requested security services, then finds the optimal
placements of all the requested VNFs including the VSFs that
achieve minimal latency across the SFC, and ensures that all
the security functions are placed in a manner to insure their
proper operation. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
i) Provide a set of security rules to place VSFs along with
the SFC instances.
ii) Capture the nature of SFCs, which is translated using the
dependencies/redundancies between the VNF instances.
iii) Propose an optimization model that chooses the optimal
placement for VNFs/VSFs to minimize their latency.
iv) Consider functionality specific constraints of the chosen
VSFs within the SFC to ensure the correct operation of
all the security functions within the SFC.
v) Capture the interactions between the VSFs and VNFs of
the SFC.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work for security-aware NFV placement.
Section III gives an overview of the security services’ chal-
lenges/requirements in NFV environment. Section IV defines
the problem architecture, the MILP model, and its constraints.
Section V discusses the evaluation results. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper and defines the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The placement of VNFs has received close attention from the
research community. This is mainly due to how critical the
location of these VNFs is on their applications’ performance.
In delay strict applications, the location of certain VNFs can
play a big role in the overall performance of the SFC.
Many approaches have looked at how to optimally place
such services and reduce the overall delay experienced by the
network. Luizelli et al. [8] formalize the problem of optimal
placement of VNFs and the chaining of SFCs using an integer
Fig. 1: SFCs in NFVI.
linear programming (ILP) model to achieve optimality in both
reducing the delay while optimizing the allocated resources.
Their heuristic approach generates a 25% reduction in the
delay of the network with a resource over-provisioning of 4%.
Bouet et al. [9] consider the placement of one type of a virtu-
alized security function, which is the Deep Packet Inspection.
They optimize the placement of this service while minimizing
the cost of the operator and meeting the traffic and security
targets. Their results show a clear relation between the network
structure and the cost with the time performance. Although
there are several approaches that aim at placing such services
while considering some performance-aware constraints, they
overlook the security-aware constraints of those placements in
conjunction with other key requirements such as latency, avail-
ability, and other performance-aware requirements. Bhamare et
al. [10] provide an overview of the optimization problems in
SFCs where they highlight the need for more research in the
area of SFC security. Therefore, it is critical to design a model
that focuses on the security aspect of SFCs especially in the
era of Big Data, Internet of Things (IoT), and the proliferation
of cloud applications.
This paper addresses one of the key challenges of NFV,
which is the security-aware placement. As discussed earlier,
most of the existing VNF placement optimization approaches
discard the characteristics of the security services they place.
With that being said, this paper understands the nature of the
NFV services’ requirements where each one of those services
has strict constraints that should be met to function properly
and not jeopardize the network as a whole. The details of
such constraints and scenarios are discussed in the below
section. However, capturing these security constraints into a
deployment solution is not enough if the applications do not
achieve the required performance. There rise the challenge
of keeping the network latency at a minimum; hence, this
paper aims to optimally place those services for the goal
of maximizing the network security while maintaining the
absolute minimum delay achievable.
III. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
NFV has provided a dynamic way of service instantiation in
real-time, which seamlessly allows cloud-based applications
to become optimized and more customizable for the end-
user needs. With such abilities, the SFC becomes capable
of applying modifications in real-time such as, instantiating,
migrating, or dropping specific VNFs to provide the end-user
with their requested service [4]. Within this architecture, many
security services can be requested specifically by the end-
user or deployed automatically by the controller to ensure the
overall security of the SFC. These security services have strict
functionality constraints that should be satisfied for correct
operation. However, these constraints are often overlooked in
the literature work where most of the placement optimization
techniques focus on more general constraints such as, delay,
energy, and cost of the NFV applications [10]. Within those
models, there is no separation between the type of VNFs that
are being placed where all the VNFs (including the VSFs) are
deployed and managed using the same set of constraints. This
approach results in many unfeasible placements of the VSFs
that put the overall security of the SFC at risk [11].
Shameli-Sendi et al. [11] have proposed best practices for
security functions by expressing them using Network Security
Defense Patterns (NSDP). These NSDPs provide a general
overview on how specific security services must be located in
reference to each other or to other VNFs of an SFC. However,
these constraints introduce potential delays on the SFC and
sometimes contradict with the performance constraints of the
services offered to the end-user. This can be very crucial for
mission critical and delay sensitive applications.
In this work, we propose a solution to address this problem by
incorporating the security rules with the QoS constraints of the
SFC to ensure that the SFC has the VSFs deployed using the
best security practices while meeting the delay requirements.
Our proposed solution considers four main security constraints
that can be mapped to most VSFs in a cloud application. We
namely consider alliance, conflict, redundancy, and proximity
constraints. These constraints aim to ensure that all the VSFs
of an SFC are placed in a manner that ensures their correct
operation and does not compromise the network security.
Our model takes into consideration the characteristics of
each candidate service node (delay, available capacity, and
interaction demands (affinity/anti-affinity zone)) with the goal
of placing all the requested VNFs and VSFs to achieve the
lowest possible latency for that chain.
IV. PROBLEM MODELLING
In order to incorporate security needs into the SFC placement,
it is necessary to first understand the nature of the VSFs and
their best practices. This section describes the VSFs and their
requirements and proposes the constraints to satisfy the QoS
requirements and meet the service level agreement (SLA) in
a cloud environment where a set of DCs in the same or in
different zones are responsible of hosting the VNFs and VSFs.
A. System design
With the shift towards a virtualized environment, NSPs can
mitigate many security threats. For instance, by using a
centralized security management, the SDN controller can
TABLE I: Security threats and their counter security functions.
Security vulnerabilities VSF
• Excessive bandwidth usage
• Malformed network packets DPI
• Sybil attacks
• Denial of service attacks
• Policy violations
IDS
• Data alteration
• Sniffing attacks
• Eavesdropping attacks
Encryption
• Port scanning
• Fragmentation attacks Firewall
dynamically add, update, or terminate security policies across
all VNFs. This is a major advantage in comparison to having
per-VNF security policies that might become quickly outdated,
as the architecture of the network and the neighboring VNFs
is very dynamic. Therefore, it is important to capture all the
VNFs instantiated within an SFC at once to determine the
necessary security constraints required to manage the proper
interaction between all the functions. Such an infrastructure is
still susceptible to a wide range of security threats and attacks.
Table I shows a general overview of the most common security
threats that NFV faces and the security function services that
can be used to mitigate those threats.
In our work, we consider a set of key security functions to
be placed within an SFC, namely Firewall, DPI, and IDS.
It is necessary to note that these functions can also include
encryption as a service, Network virus/malware scanning,
Transport Layer Security (TLS) proxy, Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) mitigation, data loss prevention, and applica-
tion visibility & control. A set of these services will be chosen
for deployment within a requested SFC. The services can
either be requested by the end-user explicitly or instantiated
by the controller as default functions to secure certain network
services. The overall placement of the entire SFC depends on
the security and QoS constraints of the service nodes and on
minimizing the latency of the SFC. Below are the details of
each security constraint that is considered in our work.
a) Alliance: This rule allows two VSFs to operate in parallel.
It gives VSFs the ability to work together in terms of their
functionalities to increase the security of the SFC.
b) Conflict: Through this rule, restrictions are added on which
VSFs should not reside on the same node.
c) Redundancy: For critical security services such as, IDSs
and DPIs, it is important that they retain their states and
information even after failure. Hence, this rule ensures that
these services can recover through their redundant instances.
d) Proximity: This rule insures that VSFs with strict delay
requirements are deployed with the closest proximity to their
dependent VNFs or VSFs by insuring the minimal delays on
the links between them.
B. Mathematical modeling
Considering the above architecture, a MILP model is designed
to ensure the optimal deployment of NFV services while main-
taining security requirements and satisfying the performance
needs in terms of latency, resources, and intercommunication
constraints. This section gives an overview of the MILP model,
its decision variables, objectives and the problem formulation.
1) Notations
Each SFC has a set of VNF instances v denoted as Iv .
Different VSFs are placed in this chain to secure the VNF
instances. Each set of security instances s is denoted as Is .
With that being said, a set of functions’ instances is denoted
as IT where T represents the type of the instance whether it
is a VSF or a VNF. The total number of instances in the IT
set is defined as IT
total
. ITA represents a subset of I
T where the
instances here interact with each other in a distributed manner.
In other words, this subset reflects the functions that satisfy
the anti-affinity constraint (such as redundant instances). ITco
represents a subset of IT where the instances here closely
collaborate with each other (dependency between instances).
In short, this subset reflects the functions that satisfy the
affinity/alliance constraint. Each server node belongs to a
specific data center, and its set is denoted as N . N total
represents the total number of servers in a given setting. A
single node of the server set is defined as n. In terms of the
computational resources representation, C denotes the capacity
set, which is CPU and memory. This set has two resource
types, and each type is denoted as c. A single instance of
VNF or VSF is denoted as i. ITcapic represents the resources
requirement c of a certain instance i of specific type IT . Ncapnc
represents the available resources c of a certain server node
n. As for the delay parameters, the communication latency
between two server nodes n and n′ is defined as LServernn′ . L
Tol
i j
is the latency tolerance between the instances of IT .
2) Decision variables
LTT
′
i j is an integer decision variable that defines the latency
between two instances i and j of IT and IT
′
respectively
where T and T ′ are of different types (either between
VNFs, between VSFs, or between VNF and VSF). As for
the placement binary decision variable, DTin denotes the
deployment state of a function instance i on a server node
n. The latency between the hosting nodes should meet the
tolerance latency between functions’ instances and is reflected
using YTT
′
in . These decision variables are defined as follows:
DTin =
{
1 i f n host i
0 otherwise
(1)
YTT
′
in =
{
1 i f LTT
′
i j ≤ LToli j
0 otherwise
(2)
3) Optimization modeling
The optimization MILP model aims to minimize the delay
between the intercommunicating VNFs, between intercommu-
nicating VSFs, and between VNFs and their corresponding
VSFs. This objective function satisfies the aforementioned
constraints, all for meeting the SLA and security requirements
and the efficient operation/practices of the security instances
while providing the optimal deployment of these functions.
Objective function:
Minimize
IT
total∑
i
IT
′
tot al∑
j
LTT
′
i j +
IT
total∑
i
IT
total∑
j
LTTij (3)
Subject to:
Decision Variables Constraints:
DTin & Y
TT ′
in  {0, 1} ∀ n  N, ∀ i  IT (4)
LTT
′
i j ≥ 0 ∀ i, j  IT & IT
′
(5)
Proximity Constraints:
(LServernn′ − LTT
′
i j ) ≤ M × YTT
′
in
∀ i, j  IT & IT ′ ∀ n, n′  N (6)
(DTin − DT
′
jn′) ≤ M × (1 − YTT
′
in )
∀ i, j  IT & IT ′ ∀ n, n′  N (7)
LTT
′
i j ≤ LToli j ∀ i, j  IT & IT
′
(8)
where T and T ′ can be of different or similar function types
Conflict & Anti-Affinity Constraints:
DTin + D
T
i′n ≤ 1 ∀ i, i′  ITA, ∀ n  N (9)
DTin + D
T ′
i′n ≤ 1 ∀ i, i′  IT & IT
′
, ∀ n  N (10)
where T and T ′ are different function types
Collaborative Constraints:
DTin + D
T
i′n ≤ 2 ∀ i, i′  ITco, ∀ n  N (11)
Computational Capacity (Nodes) Constraints:
N tot al∑
n=0
DTin = 1 ∀ i  IT (12)
IT
total∑
i=0
DTin × ITcapic ≤ Ncapnc ∀ n  N, ∀ c  C (13)
The proposed model generates optimal deployments of VNF
instances and their corresponding VSFs where both functions
will form the SFCs. This deployment takes into consideration
the functionality constraints that are captured through the com-
putational resources and latency requirements. It also considers
the nature of security services and their interaction among each
other (in terms of location, order, redundancy, and communi-
cation) as well as their relation with the SFC instances. This
model also captures the dependency between the SFC compo-
nents (VNFs and VSFs) as well as the intercommunication of
the same VNF type instances. Constraints (4) and (5) ensure
that the decision variables of deployments (DTin and Y
TT ′
in ) are
binary and the latency is a positive one. The latency constraints
are captured in (6), (7), and (8). Constraint (6) ensures that
the calculated delay should meet the latency tolerance between
Fig. 2: vEPC Architecture.
the SFC instances, the security services, or the VNFs and
the security instances. Constraints (7) and (8) ensure that the
SFC and security instances are deployed on server nodes that
satisfy the latency requirements. Due to the nature of VNFs
and security services, there exist dependency and redundancy
relations between them. Each of these interactions requires
specific deployment settings. To ensure availability of at least
one SFC and its corresponding security services, constraints
(9) and (10) ensure that these redundant VNF instances or
security instances should be distributed across different nodes.
This can be within the same DC network or across different
zones. These constraints can also apply on the VNF instances
that collaborate closely and can tolerate the outage of the
parent instance. Similarly, it applies on the security services
that depend on each other with high tolerance time. To enhance
the QoS of SFCs and the communication among and within the
security functions, constraint (11) ensures that the dependent
VNF instances or security instances with low tolerance time
(in case of outage/failure) can share the same server node.
Regarding computational resource constraints, constraint (12)
ensures that the server node has enough capacity to host
the SFC’s components. Constraint (13) determines that each
instance whether a VNF or a VSF is deployed on at most one
server node.
V. USE CASE AND EVALUATION
In order to understand the importance of incorporating delay
requirements with security-aware constraints, we compare a
latency-agnostic greedy algorithm with the proposed MILP
model. The greedy algorithm aims at placing the VNF and
VSF instances on the nodes that satisfy the computational
resource requirements while overlooking the latency and the
discussed security rules. This comparison highlights the impor-
tance of minimizing the SFC delays while insuring the correct
and optimal placement of the requested security services. For
the simulations, we have considered the virtualized Evolved
Packet Core (vEPC) as a use case given its visionary nature
that facilitates its extension to the emerging 5G system. Fig. 2
shows the vEPC architecture. The EPC is introduced as an
TABLE II: Simulation dataset.
VNF/VSF Type Number of Instances
MME 2
HSS 1
SGW 2
PGW 2
Firewall 2
DPI 2
IDS 2
Total 13
all-Internet-Protocol (IP) core network architecture by the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). It is used heavily
in mobile networks for the purpose of providing broadband
services [12].
With SDN and NFV technologies, the major components of the
EPC can be virtualized and decoupled from their hardware, al-
lowing for rapid scalability and dynamic instantiation of those
components in real-time to adapt immediately to any end-user
request or changes in network demands. Each main component
is considered as a VNF, and the path from the end user
through the vEPC components is the SFC. In this simulation,
we consider the 4 network components of the vEPC, Home
Subscriber Server (HSS), Mobile Management Unit (MME),
Serving Gateway (SGW), and Packet Data Network Gateway
(PGW). As for the security services, the VSFs to be deployed
within the vEPC chain depend on the user requirements or can
be pre-defined by the service provider. For this use case, we
consider 3 VSFs, Firewall, DPI, and IDS, as they are essential
security functions for the vEPC. For this combination of VNFs
and VSFs, the model is given the set of intercommunication
(dependency and/or redundancy) and security rules for each
VNF and VSF. These rules are translated into the above
constraints that should be satisfied to deploy the VNFs and
VSFs. In this setup, the Firewall instances should be deployed
with the closest proximity to their corresponding VNFs to
ensure better network protection. The IDS instances should
meet the alliance requirements where state sharing is enabled
between IDS instances to protect certain VNFs and deal with
variations in the attack traffic [13][14]. In other words, the
IDS instances are deployed as an active-active VSFs model on
two different service nodes. Finally, the DPI instances are key
functions that maintain critical information about the network
traffic in their instances. Therefore and to ensure maximum
protection of the SFC, these instances should be deployed
with at least one redundant instance to recover their states
in case of any failures. These redundant components should
obey the anti-affinity rules. The structure of this simulation
highlights the importance of considering the functional specific
constraints for such critical VSFs while minimizing the delay
across the generated SFCs and complying with the network
requirements while enhancing its security. Table II shows the
dataset (number of instances for each VNF and VSF) used to
build the SFCs.
A. Results and discussion
The above simulation is evaluated through the vEPC core. It
is carried on a Virtual Computing Server with 48 CPU cores
and 128 GB of memory and has generated 512 SFCs. Fig. 3
shows two of these optimal placement paths for each VNF and
VSF. In this figure, the proximity rule has ensured that any
instance of a Firewall is deployed with maximum proximity to
its VNF. In this setting, the user nodes and the SGWs require
Firewalls. The IDS instances are deployed as an active-active
redundancy model and are insured to be hosted on different
service nodes using the conflict/anti-affinity rule. Similarly, the
DPI function has been deployed on a different service node
than its redundant instance. The proposed model is capable
of ensuring the minimal delay possible for all the 512 SFCs
while traversing all their required VSFs. Compared to the
latency-agnostic greedy algorithm, the proposed approach has
achieved very promising results. Fig. 4 shows the latency
in (µs) of all the generated SFCs and highlights how the
MILP model has minimized their delays in comparison with
the greedy algorithm. The model does not only cover the
minimization of the SFC latency as a whole, it also insures the
minimal link delays between each VNF and VSF. These results
give the controller and the user the flexibility of scaling on
these links either by adding new VNF instances or enhancing
the security of the SFC with introducing more VSFs. In terms
of the intra-latency between the VNF and VSF, Fig. 5 shows
the latency between the DPI and PGW instances using the
proposed MILP model and the Greedy algorithm. Similarly,
Fig. 6 highlights the link latency between the Firewall-1 and
MME-1/MME-2. In the DPI-PGW case, we have 2 instances
of each and thus 4 possible paths/links. In the Firewall-MME
case, there is 1 instance of the firewall connected to 2 MME
instances, which translates into 2 possible links. In both cases,
the model significantly outperforms the greedy approach as it
considers the latency of the interacting VNFs and VSFs as well
as the whole chain. Table III shows the detailed comparison
of all the links between the VNFs and their corresponding
VSFs. Our model is able to select the best deployments while
satisfying the aforementioned security rules and minimizing
the delay of every link created. With this evaluation, the
proposed approach can be applied to other use cases in an NFV
environment such as, Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication
services. It will also enable us to carry on with this work
towards introducing additional security rules and enhancing
the collaboration between VNFs and VSFs.
B. Computational complexity discussion
Reduction methods are well-defined approaches that determine
the complexity of optimization models. When a problem Y
is reduced to a certain problem X , the algorithm solving X
can be used for Y as well. However, this method is not only
used for design purposes, but also for classifying the difficulty
or hardness of Y . Since the proposed problem falls in the
scheduling category, it can be represented as bipartite matching
graph problem. This graph has VNF and VSF instances as
TABLE III: The latency (µs) between VNF and VSF instances.
Function Instances MILPModel
Greedy
Algorithm
FW-1/MME-1 399 731
FW-1/MME-2 477 746
MME-1/IDS-1 417 721
MME-1/IDS-2 481 794
MME-2/IDS-1 640 959
MME-2/IDS-2 794 1047
IDS-1/HSS 417 959
IDS-2/HSS 794 1047
SGW-1/FW-2 715 823
SGW-2/FW-2 933 1083
DPI-1/PGW-1 394 706
DPI-1/PGW-2 492 905
DPI-2/PGW-1 869 951
DPI-2/PGW-2 877 1047
a set of vertices, the server nodes as the edges, and the
deployment decision variable as the arc that maps a service
instance to a node and denoted as {i, n}. Hoogeveen et al.
have reduced this graph problem to an NP-hard problem
[15][16]. With that being said, the proposed MILP model is
an NP-hard problem by reduction. Thus, this problem can be
solved by exact methods only for small-scale instances due
to its time complexity. Since the exact solution cannot be
determined by a polynomial-time approach for large scale, we
aim at extending this work with an approximation, heuristic,
or reduced enumeration algorithms to solve this challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
SDN and NFV approaches have given NSPs massive incen-
tives to quickly transform their architecture towards a fully
virtualized environment. In such environment, NSPs should
still comply with the strict SLA requirements and maintain
their QoS while insuring maximum security of their networks.
In this paper, we have addressed the challenge of securing the
generated SFCs within a cloud environment by maximizing the
effectiveness of the VSFs deployed to protect those SFCs. This
paper has considered the strict functionality constraints of the
VSFs to perform correctly. These constraints include alliance
of functions, conflict, and proximity constraints. Additionally,
this paper has also incorporated the strict delay requirements
and other functional needs that should be met to comply with
the SLAs. For this purpose, we proposed a MILP model to
satisfy the security constraints of the SFCs while insuring
the minimization of the SFC delays across the DC network.
We compared the results with a Greedy latency-agnostic
algorithm to pinpoint the importance of a benchmark model
that includes the functional constraints and their impact on the
NFV application’s performance. Although the proposed MILP
model has generated better results compared to the latency-
agnostic approach, it is a computationally complex model.
With this being said, this work will be extended to develop a
heuristic solution for large scale network settings.
Fig. 3: The interaction of different instances (VNF & VSF) of the SFCs.
Fig. 4: The overall delay of the generated SFCs.
Fig. 5: The latency between DPI and PGW instances.
Fig. 6: The latency between Firewall and MME instances.
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